St. John's Law Review
Volume 1, December 1926, Number 1

Article 17

Corporations--Principal and Agent in Contract for Land Sale Where
Principal is a Non-Existent Corporation (Weiss et al. v. Baum, 217
N.Y. Supp. 820 (App. Div. 2nd Dept. 1926))
St. John's Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

RECENT DECISIONS
eyes of the law the relation of master and servant is created. Judgment affirmed. Fuller v. Metcalf, 130 Atl. 875 (Sup. Ct. Me. 1925).
.The authorities are unanimous in holding that a master is always
liable for the negligence of his servant while in the course of the
master's business. Round v. Delware Lana W. Ry. Co., 64 N. Y.
129, 21 Am. Rep. 597 (1876); 2 Cooley, Torts, 1925, sec. 3; Cosgrove
v. Ogden, 49 N. Y. 255 (1872). The mere fact that the relation of
parent and child is present should in no way affect the relation of
principal and agent with consideration given to the fact that the
minor receives no compensation for his services. Johnson v. Newman, 271 S. W. 705 (1925); Daggy v. Miller, 180 Ia. 1151, 162 N. W.
859 (1917) ; Kelley v. Thbodeau, 120 Me. 402, 115 Atl. 162 (1921). The
payment of money is not necessary to create the relation of master
and servant as long as there is some valuable consideration given in
return. 2 Cooley, Torts 1007. There are some cases which hold that
upon some facts as in principal case the parent would be classed as
a mere guest and no liability can be attached to him. Reiter v.
Graber, 173 Wis. 493, 181 N. W. 739 (1921); 18 A. L. R. 362. But
the soundness of the above rule is questioned and is not considered
the better of the two rules. Where an automobile is in the possession
of a bailee there is without doubt no liability placed on the owner
although he is present in the car. Potts v. Pardee, 220 N. Y. 431,
116 N. E. 78 (1917), 8 A. L. R. 785; Pease v. Montgomery, 111 Me.
582, 88 Atl. 973 (1913). But in the principal case the minor daughter
was not a bailee of the automobile but was a servant of the defendant
parent. A passenger who is also the owner (not a bailee) who
accepts services rendered his right of control of automobile and every
reason for the application of the doctrines of respondet superior is
present.
CORPORATIONS-PRINCIPAL AND AGENT IN

CONTRACT FOR LAND SALE

action for
specific performance of a written contract for the sale and transfer of
realty, the defendant herein fraudulently represented himself to be the
agent of a non-existent corporation, alleged to be in the process of
formation. The contract proceeds in the customary form employed
in the sales of real property with the duly attested signatures of the
plaintiffs and the corporation by the defendant as agent. The plaintiffs seek to hold the defendant as the real purchaser and demand
judgment against him as the real vendee for specific performance of
the contract. It is further alleged that defendant committed a fraud
in representing to the plaintiffs that a certain corporation was then
being effected by him and in process of incorporation under the laws of
the State of New York. Held, in the Lower Court, the learned judge
held that the grounds of the complaint were untenable and accordingly
dismissed the case. This ruling was affirmed by the Appellate Division.
"Weiss et al. v. Baum, 217 N. Y. Supp. 820 (App. Div. 2nd Dept. 1926).
The Court recognized that the proposition presented here appears
not to have been decided in New York but the principles involving the
personal liability of one assuming to act as agent for a non-existent
principal or claiming a power of agency without authority, have been
frequently set forth. Plew v. Board, 274 Ill. 232, 113 N. E. 603 (1916).
Earlier decisions in New York supporting such liability have been regarded by the Courts as "substantially repudiated." White v. Madison,
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26 N. Y. 117, 123 (1862), and in later cases, an agent was held liable
for damages for a breach of contract arising out the agent's implied
warranty on an unauthorized power he assumed to possess. Baltzen
v. Nicolay, 53 N. Y. 467 (1873); Taylor v. Nostrand, 134 N. Y. 110,
31 N. E. 246 (1892); 116 App. Div. 748 (2nd Dept. 1907), 113 N. Y.
Supp. 688, 61 M. 286 (1908). Proceeding further, on a written contract to purchase a plant of a new company to be thereupon organized,
the defendants were not held liable; Fowle v. Kerchner, 87 N. C. 49
(1882); thereby following the point most stressed in the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky, which held that where the agent did not undertake to guaranty a ratification, one cannot bind him; Murray v. Carothers, 1 Metc. (Ky.) 71 (1858). In the principal case, there is no dispute as to the parties to the contract. The defendant, was not named
as purchaser, but a corporate vendee was specified. There was no mistake, either mutually or unilaterally, thus it follows that the contract
was not of the defendant nor can he be a substitute vendee, for to do
so would be the effecting of a new contract. The authority for the
preceding statement has been based upon the qualification of the general
rule of law, as to the agent's personal liability, Ogden v. Raymond,
22 Conn. 379, 385 (1853), (58 Am. Dec. 529), with the aid of another
state's corollary ruling; Belding v. Vaughan, 108 Ark. 69, 157 S. W.
400 (1913), where knowledge is imputed.
Upon authority, therefore, unless it is clear that an agent, upon
the face of the contract is intended to be personally bound, the agent
cannot be held, Mechen Agency (1st Ed.), Sect. 550, and "even though
the contract itself cannot be enforced against the principal, the agent
may be held for the fraud." 2 Clark & Syles, Law of Agency, Sec.
567. Thus, the action on a contract by an unauthorized agent in dealing with another, can be compelled to respond therefor, for the loss
occasioned by his act, Taylor v. Nostrand, 134 N. Y. 108, 110; 31 N. E.
246, 247 (1908), and again, recognized for the damages sustained by
the purchaser. Rowland v. Hall, 121 App. Div. 459, 106 N. Y. Supp. 55
(2nd Dept. 1907). Thus, it is submitted that the action cannot be
properly upheld for specific performance and that relief can only be
granted in an action based upon fraud.
ADIiiRALTY-TURISDICTIN-SUIT

FOR

WRONGFUL

DEATH-PLACE

OF DEATH-INJuRY TO DivER-Plaintiff's intestate, while employed as
a diver by a shipbuilding company, submerged himself from a floating
barge anchored in a navigable river in Texas thirty-five feet from the
bank, for the purpose of sawing off timbers of an abandoned set of
ways, once used for launching ships, which had become an obstruction
to navigation. While thus submerged he died of suffocation due to
failure of the air supply. Damages for the death were recovered from
the employer's insurer under the workmen's compensation law of Texas.
Held, that the facts disclosed a maritime tort to which the general
admiralty jurisdiction would extend save for the provisions of the
state compensation Act; but the matter is of 'Mere local concern and
its regulation by the State will work no material prejudice to any
characteristic feature of the general maritime law. The Act prescribes
the only remedy; its exclusive features abrogate the right to resort to
the admiralty court which otherwise would exist. Millers' Underwriters
v. Braud, 270 U. S.49 (1926).
The Supreme Court based its decision on the case of Grant SmithPorter v. Rohde, 257 U. S.469 (1922), which held that where a car-

